TYPOLOGY OF NOTHING: HEIDEGGER, DAOISM AND BUDDHISM [abstract] by Yao, Zhihua
Comparative Philosophy 1.1 (2010)                                               YAO 
Comparative Philosophy Volume 1, No. 1 (2010): 78-89 
Open Access / ISSN 2151-6014 
http://www.comparativephilosophy.org 
 
 
TYPOLOGY OF NOTHING: 
HEIDEGGER, DAOISM AND BUDDHISM 
 
ZHIHUA YAO 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Parmenides expelled nonbeing from the realm of knowledge and forbade 
us to think or talk about it. But still there has been a long tradition of nay-sayings 
throughout the history of Western and Eastern philosophy. Are those philosophers talking 
about the same nonbeing or nothing? If not, how do their concepts of nothing differ from 
each other? Could there be different types of nothing? Surveying the traditional 
classifications of nothing or nonbeing in the East and West have led me to develop a 
typology of nothing that consists of three main types: 1) privative nothing, commonly 
known as absence; 2) negative nothing, the altogether not or absolute nothing; and finally 
3) original nothing, the nothing that is equivalent to being. I will test my threefold typology 
of nothing by comparing the similarities and differences between the conceptions of 
nothing in Heidegger, Daoism and Buddhism. These are three of the very few philosophical 
strains that have launched themselves into the wonderland of negativity by developing 
respectively the concepts of nothing (Nichts), nothing (wu 無) and emptiness (śūnyatā). 
With this analysis, I hope that I will clarify some confusion in the understanding of nothing 
in Heidegger, Daoism and Buddhism, and shed light on the central philosophical issue of 
“what there is not”. 
 
Keywords: nothing, absence, Heidegger, Daoism, Buddhism 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Parmenides expelled nonbeing from the realm of knowledge and forbade us to 
think or talk about it. But still there has been a long tradition of nay-sayings 
throughout the history of Western and Eastern philosophy. Are those philosophers 
talking about the same nonbeing or nothing? If not, how do their concepts of 
nothing differ from each other? Could there be different types of nothing? 
 Leibniz once famously argued against the possibility of there being more than 
one void. He maintains that if there could be more than one void, then there could 
be two voids of exactly the same shape and size. These two voids would be perfect 
twins (Sorensen 2009, sec. 9). Leibniz‘s argument suggests that if we are dealing 
with empty space, then a type of nothing potentially has ―shape‖ or ―size‖. But the 
variety of traditional conceptions of nothing is much more complicated than this. 
____________________ 
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 Surveying the traditional classifications of nothing or nonbeing in the East and 
West have led me to develop a typology of nothing that consists of three main 
types: 1) privative nothing, commonly known as absence; 2) negative nothing, the 
altogether not or absolute nothing; and finally 3) original nothing, the nothing that 
is equivalent to being. I do not claim that these exhaust the types of nothing in 
which many other philosophers had more finely grained classification schemes. For 
instance, the Neo-Platonist Ammonios Hermeiu and the Indian Yogācārins 
distinguished five different types of nothing, whereas Marius Victorinus (another 
Neo-Platonist), Immanuel Kant, and mainstream Indian philosophy had developed 
various fourfold schemes. However, I think my typology will suffice for the 
purpose of my paper which is to examine the similarities and differences between 
the conceptions of nothing in Heidegger, Daoism and Buddhism. The reason why I 
choose these three philosophical strains to test my typology of nothing is not only 
because I am familiar with them, but also because they each respectively represent 
the developing concepts of nothing in the West, China and India.    
  The logical positivist Rudolf Carnap once criticized the Western tradition of 
metaphysics by taking Heidegger‘s theory of nothing as an extreme case of 
meaningless discourse (Carnap 1931, 233). Similarly, in the eyes of orthodox 
Confucian and Hindu scholars, both Daoism and Buddhism were seen as passive, 
negative, and even destructive to intellectual and social norms. In fact, these 
scholars condemned them as heresies and were determined to eliminate their 
influence on Chinese and Indian minds. It is no accident that their opponents 
developed a ―negative‖ impression of these traditions. These are three of the very 
few philosophical strains that have launched themselves into the wonderland of 
negativity by developing respectively the concepts of nothing (Nichts), nothing (wu 
無) and emptiness (śūnyatā). 
 
 
2.  ORIGINAL NOTHING 
 
In his major work Being and Time, Heidegger apparently did not treat nothing as a 
central issue. Only in his analysis of Angst, one of the fundamental attunements 
(Befindlichkeit) of Dasein, does he touch upon this concept. The idea of Angst is 
deeply rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition. In a long footnote in section 40 on 
―The fundamental attunement of Angst as an eminent disclosedness of Da-sein‖, 
Heidegger refers to Augustine, Luther and Kierkegaard to support his distinction 
between Angst and fear (Furcht). With regard to Angst, Heidegger says:  
 
The fact that what is threatening is nowhere characterizes what Angst is about. Angst ―does 
not know‖ what it is about which it is anxious. But ―nowhere‖ does not mean nothing; rather, 
region in general lies therein, and disclosedness of the world in general for essentially spatial 
being-in. Therefore, what is threatening cannot approach from a definite direction within 
nearness, it is already ―there‖ - and yet nowhere. It is so near that it is oppressive and stifles 
one‘s breath - and yet it is nowhere. In what Angst is about, the ―it is nothing and nowhere‖ 
becomes manifest (Heidegger 1963, 186; Stambaugh 1996, 174-5).  
 
It is nothing (Nichts) and nowhere (nirgends), and yet the disclosedness of the 
world lies within it. This reminds us of God being depicted in negative terms within 
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the mystical Christian tradition. In contrast to the philosophical discussions of 
nothing, as found in early western philosophers, such as Parmenides and Plato, the 
Christian mystics who developed the negative theology regard nothing as an 
experience. Their view has influenced many classical German philosophers 
including Schelling and Hegel. In this sense, nothing is not an abstract concept, but 
rather a reality that can be experienced. This is similar to the Eastern mystical 
tradition of Daoism that emphasizes the sagely practice of experiencing nothing 
(shengren ti wu 聖人體無).  
 Of course, it is not so easy to experience nothing. In fact, Heidegger admits 
that such an experience is rare. In Heidegger‘s What is Metaphysics, he states: 
―Does such an attunement, in which man is brought before the nothing itself, occur 
in human Dasein? It can and does occur, although rarely enough and only for a 
moment, in the fundamental mood of Angst.‖ (Heidegger 1978, 111; 1998, 88, with 
my modification) In this work of 1929, we find the most extensive discussion of 
nothing by Heidegger. Most of the work illustrates how nothing is revealed and 
experienced in Angst. Moreover, he develops another theme that is not seen in 
Being and Time which is the relationship between being and nothing. He says, 
―nothing does not remain the indeterminate opposite of beings but unveils itself as 
belonging to the being of beings‖. (Heidegger 1978, 120; 1998, 94) Furthermore, 
he states that ―[i]n the being of beings the nihilation (Nichten) of nothing occurs‖. 
(Heidegger 1978, 115; 1998, 91) We can infer from these statements that Heidegger 
takes nothing to be equivalent to being. 
 The idea that nothing and being is equivalent can be found in many of 
Heidegger‘s works. For instance, ―Being: Nothing: Same…Nothing is the 
characteristic (Kennzeichnung) of Being‖. 1  Reinhard May, who studied these 
expressions, tries to prove their connection with relevant statements that are found 
in Daoism and Chan Buddhism. These statements include: ―Being and nothing 
giving rise to each other‘‘ (Dao-De-Jing Ch. 2); ―The things of the world arise from 
being. And being arises from nothing‖ (Dao-De-Jing Ch. 40); ―Being is none other 
than nothing, nothing is none other than being‖ (Xin-Xin-Ming 信心銘, T2023, 
1056a). May maintains that all of these Daoist and Chan Buddhist writings were 
already translated into German in or before the 1920s, and so Heidegger may have 
read these sources and become influenced by them (May 1996, 26-8).  
 Heidegger, however, only admits Hegel‘s contribution on this point. He cites a 
statement from Hegel‘s Science of Logic: ―Pure being and pure nothing are the 
same.‖ Pure being and pure nothing are two concepts in the beginning of Hegel‘s 
logical system. They are the same because they are indeterminate, immediate and 
pure. But Heidegger disagrees with Hegel on how and why they are the same. He 
says: ―Being and nothing do belong together, not because both – from the point of 
view of the Hegelian concept of thought – agree in their indeterminateness and 
immediacy, but rather because being itself is essentially finite and manifests itself 
only in the transcendence of a Dasein that is held out into nothing.‖ (Heidegger 
1978, 120; 1998, 94-5) Here ―the transcendence of Dasein‖ is discussed earlier in 
the same work: ―Being held out into nothing – as Dasein is – on the ground of 
concealed Angst is its surpassing of beings as a whole. It is transcendence.‖ 
                                                        
1 For more examples, see May 1996, 21-6. 
81 
 
Comparative Philosophy 1.1 (2010)                                               YAO 
(Heidegger 1978, 118; 1998, 93) Dasein transcends the totality of beings and 
therefore reaches the being itself. Meanwhile, Dasein is also ―held out‖ into 
nothing, therefore being and nothing become identical in the experiential dimension 
of Dasein. 
 Another theme that Heidegger devoted himself to is the relationship between 
nothing and negativity, a concept again bearing a Hegelian mark. In Hegel‘s system, 
negativity is apparently more active and important than pure nothing. It is the 
engine of the Hegelian dialectics and makes becoming, movement and development 
possible through its force of Aufhebung. Although Heidegger insists that ―nothing is 
the origin of negation, not vice versa‖ (Heidegger 1978, 117; 1998, 86), he closely 
follows Hegel when he describes how nothing functions through negation and 
refusal. We can see this in two of Heidegger‘s works that were written in the 1930s 
but only recently published. 
 
Fullness is pregnant with the originary ―not‖; making full is not yet and no longer gifting, 
both in counter-resonance, refused in the very hesitating, and thus the charming-moving-unto 
in the removal-unto in the removal-unto. Here [is] above all the swaying not-character of 
be-ing as enowning (Heidegger 1999, 189).   
 
The questioning of the history of being not only experiences nothing not as void (Nichtiges), 
when this questioning requests the being itself in the fullness of its essential swaying, nothing 
is experienced as enownment (Er-eignung) (Heidegger 1997 , 313. My translation).  
 
  Here enowning (Ereignis) or enownment (Ereignung) functions as the 
provider or giver of being and time, and it is the ‗it‘ in the phrase ―it gives/there is‖ 
(es gibt). Meanwhile, Heidegger stresses that the withdrawal or refusal that is not 
providing or giving also belongs essentially to the enowning itself. It is this 
withdrawal or refusal that makes providing or giving possible. Therefore, in the 
withdrawal or refusal that is located in the heart of enowning, we see an original 
nothing which is the ultimate ground for negation and negativity. 
 The term ―original nothing‖ (nihil originarium) appears in Heidegger‘s 
writings only a few times. For instance, when discussing the world as nothing, he 
says: ―The world is the nothing that originally temporalizes itself and simply arises 
in and with the temporalizing (Zeitigung). We, therefore, call the world the original 
nothing (nihil originarium).‖2 Nevertheless, this term captures very well the basic 
meaning of nothing in Heidegger‘s usage, namely, as something experienced by 
Dasein‘s Angst, equivalent to being, and functioning through negation and 
withdrawal.  
By using ―original nothing‖ Heidegger also distances himself from other types 
of nothing that were discussed by previous philosophers. It is generally agreed that 
what Parmenides forbade us to talk about is ―the altogether not‖ (τὁ μηδαμῇ 
μηδαμῶς ὄν). Since Plato philosophers have tried to break this curse, but they were 
only approaching an ―absence‖. In Kant‘s fourfold classification of nothing, these 
two senses of nothing are respectively called negative nothing (nihil negativum) 
and privative nothing (nihil privativum). He characterizes the former as ―the empty 
                                                        
2 Heidegger 1990, 271. Cited from Wirtz 2006, 333. My translation. For more discussions on this 
concept, see Kwan 1982, 76, 83-84, and 142. 
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object without concept‖ that is the impossible, e.g., a two-sided rectilinear figure, 
and the latter as ―the empty object of a concept‖, e.g., a shadow or cold.3 For many 
philosophers, these are the two basic types of nothing. I therefore take them to be 
the first two types in my classification scheme. But Heidegger‘s sense of original 
nothing seems to have nothing to do with them. Instead, this nothing signifies 
alternatively to his key concept of being. Nothing as being is also one of the four 
types of nothing for the Neo-Platonist, Marius Victorinus.
4
 Its traces can be found 
in many classical German thinkers such as F.H. Jacobi, J.G. Hamann, Schelling, 
Hegel, and F. von Baader. So, I include original nothing as the third type of nothing 
in my classification scheme. With these three types of nothing in mind, we can now 
discuss the Daoist concept of nothing. 
 
 
3.  NOTHING 
 
In early Daoism, nothing may not have been a central concept as ―Dao‖ but even at 
this stage it is an essential aspect of Dao. Its position was further elevated with the 
development of the Xuan School. The Neo-Confucian scholars, also known as 
―Dao-scholars‖, were not necessarily upset by the idea of Dao, but often reacted 
strongly against nothing. Nothing may not be the central concept of Daoist 
philosophy, but it is surely the most characteristic Daoist concept.  
 According to Pang (1999, 348-63), the concept of nothing as discussed in the 
rich canons of Chinese philosophy can be classified as having three different types. 
These include ―nothing as absence‖, ―absolute nothing‖, and ―nothing as being‖ 
which are signified respectively by the characters ‗wang‘ (亡), ‗wu‘ (无) and ‗wu‘ 
(無). Interestingly, these three types correspond to the three major types of nothing 
that I identified among Western philosophers, namely, privative nothing (nihil 
privativum), negative nothing (nihil negativum) and original nothing (nihil 
originarium). It is now pertinent to consider what type of nothing the Daoists were 
talking about.  
Many contemporary scholars distinguish two senses of nothing in Lao Zi‘s 
Dao-De-Jing.
5
 One is the empirical or commonsense usage referring to empty 
space. This usage is found especially in Chapter 11 of the Dao-De-Jing, where 
nothing functions inside the hub, a pot, and the dwelling. The other is nothing in its 
metaphysical sense, referring to the source or origin of all existents, and found in 
key passages of the Dao-De-Jing, e.g., Chapters 2 and 40.
6
 This distinction, 
however, becomes irrelevant if we attempt to match Daoist nothing to my typology 
of nothing. Both space and the origin of all existents are actual existence with real 
                                                        
3 See Kant 1956, 332-3. The other two types are rational entity (ens rationis) and imaginary entity 
(ens imaginarium). 
4 See Kobusch 1984, 809. The other three types are negation, mutual relation, and the not-yet 
existent (Noch-nichtsein). Another Neo-Platonist Ammonios Hermeiu added the fifth ineffable 
unrepresentable nothing to the list. 
5 For instance, Liu 1997, 159; Wang 2001, 155; Lin 2007, 151. 
6 I exclude chapter 1, because I read the relevant sentence there as ―the nameless (wuming 無名) is 
the origin of heaven and earth‖ rather than ―nothing (wu 無) is called (ming 名) the origin of 
heaven and earth‖.  
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function. They are called nothing only because they are formless and imageless. So 
nothing for Lao Zi, either in its empirical or metaphysical sense, is the ―nothing as 
being‖ or the original nothing.  
In the Dao-De-Jing, there are also a large number of compounds in the form of 
―non-x‖ or ―no-x‖, e.g., non-action (wu-wei 無爲) and no-name (wu-ming 無名), 
where the word ‗wu‘ (‗non-‘, ‗no-‘) functions as a prefix in the compound and 
cannot act independently as a noun or a philosophical concept. Its meaning is close 
to the privative nothing or nothing as absence. The Daoist classics never seem to 
mention the absolute or negative nothing, which usually indicates logical 
impossibility as in the case of late Moist classics.
7
 
 In any case, the concept of nothing as discussed in the Daoist philosophical 
context falls under the category of original nothing or nothing as being. It is 
elaborated in two aspects. The first is the cosmogonical or vertical dimension, with 
the emphasis of nothing being the source or origin of existents: ―The things of the 
world arise from being. And being arises from nothing.‖8 It is this ability of giving 
rise to all existents that makes nothing the true original nothing. The same idea is 
elaborated in the Zhuang-Zi: ―The myriad things come forth from nonbeing. Being 
cannot bring being into being; it must come forth from nonbeing, and nonbeing is 
singularly nonbeing.‖9 The Xuan School, represented by Wang Bi, further develops 
this line of thinking and interprets nothing as the ―origin‖ (ben 本) of all things. In 
comparison to its Western counterparts, the Daoist nothing is more ―original‖ by 
emphasizing its cosmogonical dimension. 
 The second is the ontological or horizontal dimension that emphasizes ―being 
and nothing giving rise to each other‖.10 The mutual arising of being and nothing 
horizontally illuminates the identity and transformation between pure being and 
pure nothing. The formless imageless original nothing, through its identity with and 
transformation into being, establishes its ontological position in the sense of 
nothing as being. This runs parallel to the ontologies of Hegel and Heidegger. 
 Certain tension exists between the two dimensions, however, and many 
commentators have attempted to explain the apparent contradiction. In my view, the 
failure of classical Chinese philosophers, such as Lao Zi, to distinguish ontology 
from cosmology or cosmogony contributes to this tension. The admixture of 
cosmogonical and ontological approaches that dominates classical Chinese 
philosophy probably owes its existence to the centrality of sheng (生) (begetting, 
generating, giving rise to) in Daoist and Confucian metaphysics. Exactly for the 
same reason, original nothing in Lao Zi and Daoist philosophy is realized in its 
more complete ―original‖ form than in the works of Western philosophers such as 
Heidegger, who only stress its ontological dimension. 
 
                                                        
7 See the Mojing and its commentary: 無不必待有，……無天陷，則無之而無 (Nonbeing does not 
necessarily presuppose being. … In the case the nonbeing of the sky‘s falling down, it is nonbeing 
without ever having been). 
8 Dao-De-Jing, Chapter 40: 天下萬物生於有，有生於無. 
9 Zhuang-Zi, Chapter of ―Geng-Sang-Chu‖: 萬物出乎無有，有不能以有為有，必出乎無有，而
無有一無有. 
10 Dao-De-Jing, Chapter 2: 有無相生. 
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4.  EMPTINESS 
 
Let us turn to emptiness in Buddhist philosophy and its relationship to nothing. In 
early and sectarian Buddhism, the concept of emptiness was employed to interpret 
the foundational Buddhist doctrine of no-self. It became one of the key Buddhist 
concepts with the rise of Perfection of Wisdom literature and its interpretation by 
the Madhyamaka scholars. The orthodox Hindu scholars, who often classified 
Buddhist philosophy into four major schools, namely, Sarvāstivāda realism, 
Sautrāntika indirect realism, Yogācāra idealism, and Madhyamaka nihilism, were 
especially critical of the latter. In their view, emptiness may not have been the 
central concept of Buddhism, but it was no doubt the most characteristic of 
Buddhist philosophy.  
In the history of Indian philosophy, different schemes were developed for 
classifying nothing or nonbeing (abhāva). The mainstream Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas, 
and Mīmāṃsākas classified nonbeing into four types, namely, prior nonbeing 
(prāgabhāva), posterior nonbeing (dhvaṃsābhāva), mutual nonbeing (anyon-
yābhāva), and absolute nonbeing (atyantābhāva). These four types can be 
subsumed into two more basic types: absolute nonbeing and mutual nonbeing. The 
latter covers the first three of four types, which are its manifestations in temporal 
and spatial dimensions. Mutual nonbeing corresponds to privative nothing or 
absence in my typology, while absolute nonbeing is the negative nothing with 
respect to ―the altogether not‖. This popular scheme, however, does not include 
emptiness. Among the Indic sources that I have encountered, only a Yogācāra 
Buddhist text adds emptiness to the scheme as the fifth type of nonbeing. It is 
called the ―ultimate nonbeing‖ (paramārthāsat) and interpreted as ―devoid of 
intrinsic nature‖ (niḥsvabhāva), which is exactly the definition of emptiness.11  
In the history of Buddhism the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra traditions have 
developed an interpretation of emptiness. It is generally agreed that the Perfection 
of Wisdom literature and its Madhyamaka interpretation, while aiming at criticizing 
and denying intrinsic nature, made emptiness a central Buddhist concept. Intrinsic 
nature (svabhāva) was a key concept in Abhidharma scholasticism that 
characterized the unanalysable elements (dharma) of all existents. In this 
understanding, the intrinsic nature of each and every element should be distinctive 
and consistent, otherwise their distinction will collapse. Meanwhile, their consistent, 
even permanent, nature does not imply that existents made of elements do not go 
through change or transformation. All the elements and existents, as long as they 
are conditioned, must dependently arise and cease.  
 In the Madhyamaka view, however, the concept of intrinsic nature is 
incompatible with the foundational Buddhist doctrine of dependent arising. 
Nāgārjuna argues, ―[t]he origination of intrinsic nature from causes and conditions 
is illogical, since intrinsic nature originated from causes and conditions would 
become contingent. How could there be contingent intrinsic nature? Intrinsic nature 
is not contingent, nor is it dependent on others.‖
12
 By upholding the doctrine of 
                                                        
11 It is found in the encyclopedic Yogācārabhūmi (T1579, 362c) and its commentaries (T1828, 416a 
and T1829, 97a). 
12 Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 16.1-2: na saṃbhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyayahetubhiḥ / 
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dependent origination, one must give up and deny intrinsic nature, as Nāgārjuna 
declares: ―Whatever is dependently originated, I claim it is emptiness.‖13 He holds 
that all those in the net of causal arising—either conventional existence or its 
elements—are devoid of intrinsic nature and empty. For the Ābhidharmikas, such 
conventional existence—for instance, a desk or person—is conceptually 
constructed, and hence lack intrinsic nature, but their building blocks are those 
elements embedded with intrinsic nature. Nāgārjuna insists that even those building 
blocks, as long as they arise and cease in the causal network, are also ―conceptually 
constructed‖.14   
 There are at least two ways of understanding this claim of emptiness. If all 
existents are conceptually constructed, as with illusions and hallucinatory objects, 
then emptiness in this sense is absolute or negative nothing as in the case of the son 
of a barren woman or square-circle, both indicating logical impossibility. This will 
inevitably lead to a nihilist end that negates all existents, which, as a matter of fact, 
dominates classical and contemporary interpretations of the Madhyamaka 
tradition.
15
 The other way, however, emphasizes that absolute reality such as 
dharma-realm (dharmadhātu) or thusness (tathatā) is revealed through the idea of 
emptiness that denies intrinsic nature.
16
 In this view, emptiness comes close to 
original nothing or nothing as being. Nāgārjuna himself seems unwilling to fall into 
either extreme when he claims that emptiness is ―the middle way‖17 which is 
beyond nonbeing and being. From the viewpoint of my typology of nothing, if 
emptiness is beyond negative nothing (the extreme of nonbeing) and original 
nothing (the extreme of being), then it would fall under privative nothing. This 
observation is supported by the very definition of emptiness as ―devoid of intrinsic 
nature‖ which is a constant negation and antidote of any reification, even emptiness 
itself, and therefore ―emptiness is empty‖.18  
 In the Yogācāra School, even though emptiness is not as central as it is in the 
Madhyamaka School, the Yogācārins understood it very differently. They refer to a 
passage from an early Buddhist text, Cūḷasuññata-sutta, which is never cited by the 
Mādhyamikas in their extensive discussion on emptiness. The text says: ―It is seen 
that when something does not exist somewhere, that place is empty with regard to 
the former. And yet it is to be understood that when something remains somewhere 
it does exist as reality.‖19 In this case, emptiness is understood in terms of privation 
or absence, or, in an Indian term, mutual nonbeing. But this type of nonbeing is 
always relative to something existent. It is in this sense that emptiness serves as an 
antidote to intrinsic nature in Madhyamaka. But when emptiness is expanded to 
negate all existents at the ultimate level, it will cease to be a mutual nonbeing in the 
                                                                                                                                                          
hetupratyayasaṃbhūtaḥ svabhāvaḥ kṛtako bhavet // svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ 
kathaṃ / akṛtrimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca //. 
13 Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.18ab: yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe /. 
14 Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24. 18c: sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat. 
15 Contemporary scholars with this approach are represented by Eugene Burnouf, H. Jacobi, M. 
Walleser, I. Wach, A.B. Keith, and La Vallee Poussin. See Lin 1999, 183-6. 
16 Contemporary representatives of this approach are St. Schayer, Stcherbatsky, and Murti. See Lin 
1999, 186-91. 
17 Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24. 18d: saiva madhyamā //. 
18 See Piṅgala‘s commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, T1564, 33b17. 
19 Cited from Nagao 1991, 210. 
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sense of absence and become an absolute negative nonbeing. The Mādhyamikas 
themselves may not admit this, but their theory inevitably leads to this end.  
 The Yogācārins understood emptiness in terms of its root meaning of absence 
and defined ―the characteristic of emptiness as nonbeing of subject and object and 
the being of that nonbeing‖.20 The subject and object, in their epistemologically 
oriented project, is regarded as conceptual constructions on the basis of existent 
conscious processes. The concept of emptiness denies the existence of these 
conceptual constructions, yet asserts the existence of consciousness (vijñāna), 
thusness (tathatā), or dharma-realm (dharmadhātu). In this respect, emptiness is 
equivalent to the so-called ―wondrous being‖ (miao-you 妙有) and therefore comes 
close to the original nothing or nothing as being in my typology of nothing. 
 Later Tibetan Buddhists characterized the Yogācāra way of understanding 
emptiness as ―other-emptiness‖ (gzhan stong), in contrast to the ―self-emptiness‖ 
(rang stong) held by the Mādhyamikas, and condemned the former way of 
understanding as heresy. This understanding of emptiness as wondrous being, 
however, became dominant in East Asian Buddhism, a development based on the 
influence of the Yogācāra as well as the Daoist sense of original nothing. As a result, 
Buddhist emptiness and Daoist nothing were easily confused.
21
 Masao Abe (1985, 
128-30), for instance, while discussing the superiority of negativity in Eastern 
philosophy, treated Daoist nothing and Buddhist emptiness as equivalent to 
wondrous being. In his discussion, both are understood to be original nothing or 
nothing as being.  
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
By comparing the similarities and differences between the concept of nothing in 
Heidegger, Daoism and Buddhism, I have tested my threefold typology of nothing. 
If we distinguish the conceptions of nothing into three basic types, namely, 
privative, negative, and original nothing, then Heidegger‘s and Daoism‘s 
conception of nothing can be characterized as ―original nothing‖. The unique 
Daoist cosmogonical-ontological approach renders nothing more ―original‖ than its 
parallels in Western philosophy. In contrast, the emptiness in Madhyamaka 
Buddhism is basically a type of privative nothing, but its tendency to negate all 
existents at the ultimate level leads to negative nothing. And finally, the emptiness 
in Yogācāra Buddhism is basically nothing as absence or privation, but its 
affirmation of ultimate reality leads to original nothing. The latter sense of 
emptiness was more influential among East Asian Buddhists, and more easily 
confused with the Daoists‘ original nothing.  
With this analysis, I hope that I have clarified some confusion in the 
understanding of nothing in Heidegger, Daoism and Buddhism. This typology of 
nothing also sheds light on the central philosophical issue of ―what there is not‖. 
The perplexity of this issue is attributed to the fact that nonbeing or nothing, by its 
very nature, escapes from falling into a being or something and thus resists any 
                                                        
20 Madhyāntavibhāga I.13ab: dvayābhāvo hy abhāvasya bhāvaḥ śūnyasya lakṣaṇaṃ /. 
21 See the relevant studies in Luo 2003 and Zhao 2007. 
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attempt of definition or characterization. In the history of Western philosophy, the 
mystery of nothing is usually associated with two equally mysterious questions. 
One is why, according to Parmenides, can we not think or talk about nonbeing? 
This question becomes even more intriguing in contrast to the fact that we can talk 
about nonbeing or nothing with ease in our ordinary language. The other is the 
famous Leibnizian–Heideggerian question: ―Why is there something rather than 
nothing?‖ which has been taken to be the fundamental question of metaphysics.  
According to my typology of nothing, when Parmenides forbade us from 
thinking or talking about nonbeing, he was warning us against the altogether not or 
absolute nothing, e.g., square-circle and the son of a barren woman. It is evident 
that this type of nothing was mainly a logician‘s concern, including Moists, Hindu 
and Buddhist logicians, and contemporary analytical philosophers since Russell. 
Given its nature of being logically contradictory and impossible, this type of 
nothing, as predicted by Parmenides, does not really enter into the realm of 
knowledge, but rather functions as an indicator of the limit of human knowledge. 
What does enter the realm of our knowledge and ordinary language is a different 
type of nothing. To break the curse of Parmenides, Plato and his followers were 
approaching ―what there is not‖ in the sense of ―difference‖ or, in Indian 
terminology, mutual nonbeing. As the absence or privation of being, this type of 
nothing is always an essential part of our knowledge. So the reason that we can 
think or talk about nonbeing or nothing with ease is not because Parmenides was 
wrong, but because we are approaching a different interpretation of nothing. 
 Leibniz was the first philosopher to put forward the perplexing metaphysical 
question: ―Why is there something rather than nothing?‖ Various attempts to 
answer this question have understood nothing as an absolute nothing that is 
logically impossible. As a result, the existence of something is believed to have a 
higher probability or necessity. The question then becomes purely speculative, as if 
it is possible for a state of absolute nothing to exist prior to something. However, if 
we understand nothing in the Heideggerian or Daoist sense of original nothing, then 
the question is a matter of cosmogony, i.e., how a concrete something with form 
and image comes about from a formless imageless state. To answer this, Christian 
theologians would resort to God‘s will, whereas Daoists would rely on the 
creativity of Dao. In either case, nothing should not be understood as absolute 
nothing or absence; such an interpretation will lead to vain speculations. Instead, 
nothing is a formless imageless state of existence, which is described as earth and 
water covered with darkness in the Book of Genesis, or simply as chaos in Daoist 
writings. It is only with this conception of nothing that we can make sense of this 
fundamental question of metaphysics.  
I have expounded my typology of nothing by comparing the conceptions of 
nothing in Heidegger, Daoism and Buddhism (three representative philosophical 
trends in the West, China and India). Each has explored negativity to a great depth 
and preliminarily answers two perplexing questions in the philosophical discourse 
of nothing, i.e., ―why we cannot think or talk about nothing‖ and ―why there is 
something rather than nothing‖. The depth of these discussions shows that it is 
wrong to indiscriminately exclude all kinds of nothing from the proper realm of 
philosophy. Instead we should treat the subject more seriously by engaging with 
traditional sources in the East and West with the hope that we may eventually know 
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better ―what there is not‖. 
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